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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The primary goals of this report are to discuss measures to prevent suicides on commuter 
and metro rail systems, and to outline an approach to prevent suicides on rail systems. 
It was found that the number of suicides committed on rail systems in the U.S. is relatively 
low compared to the total number of suicides committed in the U.S. in general. There were 
only 180 suicides from 2003 to 2008 on 48 commuter, heavy and light rail systems—about 
30 suicides per year. By comparison, in 2010 alone, there were 38,364 suicides in the 
U.S. as a whole. It could reasonably be concluded that overall suicide prevention should 
be the responsibility of the community at large. The rail authorities should be focusing their 
limited resources on preventing and possibly mitigating suicides on the rail property itself 
and on individuals attempting to access the rail property to commit suicide. The community 
abutting a rail system could be affected by the suicides on the rail system and may look 
to the rail authority to become involved in community-based suicide prevention measures. 
However, from a cost-effective point of view, the rail authority should only become involved 
with community-based program when there is a direct connection to preventing suicides 
on the rail system itself, such as through providing phones linked to a community-based 
suicide prevention center. Rail authorities may be tempted to become involved in a broad 
community-based program, to improve public relations, but they will probably be better 
served by focusing on their own effort to prevent suicides on the rail property. Questions 
regarding the motivation to commit suicide should be left to the broader community. 
It is recommended that an approach based on the principles of benefit-cost analysis 
should be followed to identify and prioritize candidate suicide countermeasures on rail 
systems. The approach basically consists of identifying the locations and times in which 
candidate projects with high benefit-cost ratios would more likely be present. Candidate 
projects that could decrease the number of suicides would then be identified. As a next 
step, the benefit-cost ratios of the projects should be calculated. The “benefits” would 
consist of the decrease in costs associated with suicides, while the “costs” would be the 
expenses associated with implementing the countermeasure. Projects with a benefit-cost 
ratio greater or equal to one would be considered feasible from an economic point of view. 
Then the projects would be prioritized based on the benefit-cost ratios.
The locations of candidate projects could be identified as places with relatively high 
frequencies of suicides, which most likely would yield the highest probabilities for suicide 
reductions. These locations were found to be associated with areas of high population 
density, station platforms, and areas close to entry points to the rail property, such as a 
road crossing. It should be noted that in other areas of the world, such locations have been 
associated with “suicide hot spots,” such as proximity to mental hospitals. There is yet no 
evidence that such locations have played a measurable role in the U.S., but this may be 
due to the very low incidence of suicides on U.S. rail properties. 
The benefits consist of reducing the costs to society resulting from the suicides. The Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention estimated that the average cost of a suicide amounted 
to about $1 million based on 2005 data. It is recommended that research be carried out to 
determine the cost of a rail suicide in the U.S. because it is potentially higher than the cost 
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of the average suicide. Cost elements not normally present in the costs of the average 
suicide may be represented in the costs of a rail suicide. Such costs may include travel 
delays on the rail system and the effects on the surrounding road and public transportation 
systems, as well as the costs of restoring the rail system to full operational status. The 
costs associated with the impacts on engineers and train crews are also part of the latter 
cost. The cost effects of personnel turnovers should also be included. 
When using the cost of the suicide in the analysis, the “point-of-view” issue must be 
clarified. The usual approach to determining the costs for tax-funded public projects is to 
count all costs regardless of to whom they accrue. That would mean that societal impacts, 
such as the cost of counseling people who are affected by the suicides but who may not be 
members of the rail system staff, should be included in the costs. Including this higher cost 
would allow justification for higher spending. Conversely, a privately-owned rail system 
would possibly include only its own costs associated with the suicides, which would lead 
to a relatively lower expenditure on countermeasures. Most publicly-owned rail systems 
utilize tax funds, and the higher cost estimates for suicides would be justified. It is essential 
to recognize that an accurate estimate of the cost of a suicide is critical in determining the 
benefit-cost ratio, feasibility, and priority of a countermeasure.
Maintaining records associated with suicides and countermeasures would aid in the 
correct estimation for similar future projects even if these estimates would change by 
location. It is recommended that an organization such as the Federal Transit Administration 
(FTA) assume responsibility for conducting the appropriate analyses and maintaining a 
depository for relevant cost data from other rail authorities because it may not be cost-
effective for each rail authority to maintain this level of expertise. In addition, the FTA could 
undertake the lead role for disseminating relevant information and data. It should be noted 
that neither the availability of funding nor the legal feasibility for having the FTA undertake 
these tasks has been researched as part of this project, nor has it been discussed with 
the FTA. The FTA could initiate further research on this topic or take action as desired. 
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) could also become involved because some rail 
lines are shared with freight rail systems and long-distance passenger trains. 
A relatively inexpensive suicide prevention measure could consist of placing signs with 
phone numbers to call for help at station platforms and access points to the track. A 
benefit-cost analysis likely would not be necessary because the cost is relatively low, and 
the cost of carrying out a benefit-cost analysis may not be warranted. However, benefit-
cost analyses for higher-cost projects become very important in view of the anticipated 
difficulty of implementing such projects. The major reason for this difficulty is that relatively 
few suicides occur on rail systems, and consequently there is relatively little opportunity 
to decrease the cost of suicides. It may be necessary to “piggyback” on projects that 
have objectives other than reducing suicides in order to justify implementing the 
countermeasures. A case in point is implementing barriers on platforms, where preventing 
suicides is a by-product or a concomitant benefit to the primary project goal of preventing 
people from being jostled and inadvertently pushed onto the tracks. Another example is 
installing barriers to act as “seals” to make air conditioning feasible. 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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A number of other prevention measures can be utilized that fall between posting signs 
and total access restriction to tracks. These measures are composed of surveillance 
and response. They can be implemented in numerous ways, with varying degrees of 
effectiveness and cost. Surveillance can be accomplished directly by rail personnel or by 
equipment such as closed-circuit television. Personnel can handle identification, either on 
location or remotely. Then a response and intervention may be carried out by personnel 
already on the rail property, or perhaps by loudspeaker. Another option is to target all 
trespassers in certain locations. 
Previous research showed that suicides are committed either close to a station platform 
or close to rail crossings. By targeting these locations, a large portion of suicides may be 
prevented. “Piggybacking” onto other functions already being carried out by rail personnel 
could significantly reduce the cost of suicide prevention and lead to a benefit-cost ratio 
greater than one. Station agents, maintenance and operations staff, and security officers 
could be trained to execute these tasks, while personnel who deal with vandals may 
already be well-suited. If there were a community center staffed with personnel answering 
suicide hotlines, they possibly could be contracted to monitor remote cameras on rail 
property to identify people who show signs of wishing to commit suicide, and then to 
initiate a response.
The number of commuter rail systems in the U.S. is relatively small, and they have 
a comparatively low incidence of suicide. Because of this, a strategy for preventing 
suicides may be carried out in what may be described as a focused manner, coordinated 
by one or a limited number of agencies. In contrast, road fatalities number in the tens 
of thousands per year, with many road authorities implementing crash mitigation. This 
situation does not lend itself to coordination by one or only a few organizations because 
of the vast number of roadways and jurisdictions. In the case of commuter rail systems, 
suicide prevention could possibly be approached within the following framework (note 
that the literature review indicates that some of these actions already take place, although 
not all of them within the U.S.):
1. “Saturate” all rail commuter systems with relatively inexpensive signs that could 
help to prevent suicides at platforms and other entry points to tracks. This 
tactic should commence in densely populated areas and could be carried out in a 
relatively short time at relatively low cost. Track the major costs of implementation 
and suicide frequencies annually.
2. Hotlines could be implemented in a similar way, but they would be more expensive 
than signs. Pilot projects could be identified to document the incidence of calls, 
procedures, costs, etc., to determine the efficacy of this tactic. Linking to existing 
hotlines should be considered.
3. The next step would consist of implementing the systems focused on surveillance, 
identification, and response. A first step may be to implement a pilot project with 
a rail system that has a relatively high incidence of suicides. The implementation 
methods and procedures, the associated costs, and the suicide frequencies within 
the affected section of track should be documented. Such a documented pilot project 
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could commence with platforms and rail crossings in densely populated areas. 
Because it will take a long time and several projects to determine the effectiveness 
in terms of suicide prevention (because suicides are such rare events), the initial 
focus should be on gaining experience and accumulating cost data. Based on this 
experience with costs, the coverage of commuter rail systems with these types 
of suicide prevention projects could then be systematically expanded. By more 
accurately estimating the monetary and societal cost of rail suicides and the 
benefits of reducing them, a better sense could be made of whether the prevention 
measures are cost-beneficial. Monitoring the frequency, locations, and times of all 
suicides annually for all commuter rail systems, such as done in this and previous 
research, should not be difficult or very costly.
4. A similar approach to placing barriers on platforms could be carried out, but based on 
the literature review, this measure probably would be better suited to metro systems 
with limited access. It likely would be too costly for the average commuter rail system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary goals of this report are to outline an approach to identifying, selecting and 
implementing suicide countermeasures for commuter rail systems in the United States. 
Implementing countermeasures for rail system suicides is complicated. Each of these 
events has a significant effect on the rail system because it is a very public death. Railway 
suicides may account for only a small percentage of all suicides, but the numbers of 
deaths and the effects from these events are still significant.1,2 These events affect not 
only the families and friends of the victims, but they can also affect the railway personnel, 
eyewitnesses, and the community.3-12 In an article published by Krysinska and De Leo in 
the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry (2008), they mentioned that the 
costs of railway suicide are substantial due to the loss of human lives, driver and bystander 
trauma, and the delays of railway service.13 Mishara (2007) expands this list by discussing 
a railway suicide’s high cost on society; not only is there an economic burden for the rail 
service, but all the passengers are forced into a highly inconvenient situation.14 The cost 
would also include the trauma, time, and monetary costs forced upon families and friends 
to take care of the unfortunate turn of events.
Unfortunately, few railway suicide prevention programs have been implemented, and 
therefore there is not much evidence for their effectiveness.15-17 Also, for some programs 
that have been implemented, systematic evaluations have not yet been completed.18 In 
other cases, programs have been implemented, but they include a number of different 
mitigation practices, such as call-in hotlines for people contemplating suicide, trained 
personnel to address suicide attempts, etc., so it is difficult to determine the effectiveness 
of a specific program component.19 Another problematic factor is that most or all of the tests 
for the effectiveness of a preventive method are based on small samples of data.20 Having 
a few more or fewer suicides in a study period, due potentially to outside variables, could 
completely change the analysis or make it impossible for proper analysis. Additionally, 
each country and network collects and reports suicide data differently, thus creating more 
potential inaccuracies in data analysis.21 
Ideally, suicides should be prevented and, should they occur, the effects of the suicide 
impacts should be minimized as much as possible. It should be noted that this study 
focused on suicide prevention and not on suicide impacts.
In the following section of the report, an approach to identifying, selecting, and implementing 
prevention and mitigation measures will be discussed, followed by a discussion of the 
locations where and times when prevention measures should be implemented. Next, the 
efficiency and effectiveness of various countermeasures will be considered. Suggestions 
will be given for possible countermeasure implementation strategies. Finally, a summary 
will be presented of major findings and recommendations.
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II. AN APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING, SELECTING, AND 
IMPLEMENTING SUICIDE COUNTERMEASURES IN 
COMMUTER RAIL SYSTEMS
The objective of this section is to propose an approach to identifying, selecting, and 
implementing suicide countermeasures on commuter and metro rail systems.
To place the approach in context, this report will discuss the magnitude of the suicide 
problem on the rail systems as well as the general types of countermeasures. Next, the 
framework for evaluating and prioritizing the countermeasures is outlined, followed by a 
discussion of whether prevention should be focused on the broad community or restricted 
to the rail property. The cost of suicides will be given consideration as well as some specific 
aspects of classes of countermeasures.
MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM AND FOCUS OF PREVENTION EFFORTS
According to the FTA “2009 Rail Statistics Report” published by the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA),22 382 public fatalities occurred from 2003-2008, of which 180 were 
suicides. Therefore, there were about 64 public fatalities and 30 suicides on average per 
year. The number of rail organizations featured in the study is not mentioned in the report, 
but the report refers to the State Safety Oversight (SSO) Program. In another report 
published in January 2012 by the Office of the Inspector General,23 it is stated that “28 
SSOAs oversee 35 light rail and 13 heavy rail systems operated by 48 transit agencies.” 
Updated data obtained from Mr. Timothy Braxton of the FTA indicated that 272 fatalities 
were reported for 46 rail systems from 2007-2011. This amounts to an average of 45 
fatalities per year, which is fewer than for the previous period. 
By comparison, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 38,384 
suicides occurred in 2010 in the U.S.24 Most of these suicides were carried out by firearms, 
suffocation, and poisoning. In general, railway suicides account for a small percentage 
of suicides. However, for those who do choose this form of suicide, it may be due to the 
lack of resources for a less public means of death.25 Other contributing factors, given by 
Andriessen and Krysinska, include levels of accessibility, density of railway networks, social 
acceptability of using railways for suicidal purposes, and psychopathological backgrounds 
of victims.26 Law, et al., mention similar reasons for choosing a certain method of suicide 
over another.27
Accessibility and availability can have major effects on an area’s relative frequency for 
specific means of suicide. For example, in Hong Kong, over 80% of the people live in 
skyscrapers, and therefore almost 50% of the suicides are due to skyscraper jumping.28 
As another example, in the United States, where guns are integrated so heavily into the 
system, firearms are by far the leading cause of suicide. Studies have shown that gun 
suicides in the U.S. are over 50% of the overall suicides (Swissinfo.ch, 2010), whereas 
the rates in other countries are nowhere near that figure.29 Switzerland is under scrutiny for 
having the highest rate in Europe at about 24-28%.30 However, other European countries 
have a much lower percentage of suicide by guns: England and Wales stand at 2.8%, and 
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Scotland at only 1.8%.31 Even other English-speaking countries such as Canada have 
an extensively lower rate at about 19% (in 2000).32 Because most of the literature review 
for this report was based on studies from other countries, this factor definitely should be 
analyzed critically when considering mitigation measures in the United States. Therefore, 
in the United States, it may be difficult economically to justify implementing suicide relief 
campaigns specifically designed for mitigation at railways in other countries. 
Krysinska and De Leo (2008, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry) reviewed 
many studies and reported that railway suicides accounted for between 1% and 12% 
of all suicides internationally.33 In an observational study conducted in Germany from 
1991-2000, it was found that 7.0% of all suicides were completed by means of railway 
(Baumert, Erazo, and Ladwig).34 This result was also provided in the 2011 study by 
Lukaschek, Baumert, and Ladwig (BMC Public Health),35 and Mishara (2007, Crisis).36 The 
Netherlands was one of the only countries found to have a higher percentage37-39 between 
10-14%.40,41 Kerkhof has been suggested that the higher proportion of railway suicides is 
due to the Netherlands’ high population density, and because almost everyone lives within 
20 kilometers (about 12.5 miles) of open track (Mishara, 2007).42 Holdaway et al. reported 
that the railway suicide percentages in 2004 were 5.3% in Belgium, 5.0% in Sweden, and 
as mentioned, 7% in Germany.43 Mishara found other evidence including about 5% railway 
suicides in England and Wales (Clarke, 1994; Symonds, 1985), 9.4% in Turkey from 2000-
2002 (Ozdogan et al., 2006), and 3% in Canada (Transport Canada, 1996). Mishara also 
found rates from other studies including 12.4% for the Netherlands, 6.2% for Sweden, 
6.2% for Japan, 5.7% for Austria, 3.1% for Denmark, and 2.7% for Hungary.44
Victims generally choose a method of suicide based on its perceived success rate, familiarity, 
and accessibility (Holdaway et al., 2012).45 Clarke and Poyner agree that alternative 
methods may not be chosen due to less attractive qualities.46 However, potentially due to 
a lack of other resources (such as a gun or poison), suicide by railway may be a victim’s 
best option.47 It has been proven that those who choose to commit suicide on railways 
believe it to be a fast, easy, and foolproof method. This, however, is not necessarily the 
case. For instance, Krysinska and De Leo stated that 90% of railway survival victims from 
the London Underground had believed they were going to die from their attempt.48 Mishara 
(2007, Crisis) believes that psychiatric patients and others must be educated about the 
“false beliefs that rail suicides provide a certain, painless, and immediate death.”49 
Research showed that a wide range of completed-attempt percentages were present for 
different countries and railway systems. Mishara speculated that these differences are most 
likely due to “operational characteristics of the railway and metro systems, such as the speed 
at which trains travel and enter stations, their ability to stop to avoid a collision, and suicide 
prevention measures” such as suicide pits.50 In an article from the European Journal of 
Public Health, Baumert, Erazo, and Ladwig discussed a German railway study that reviewed 
data between 1991-2000.51 During this period, 9,510 suicide attempts were made with 8,653 
being fatal. This accounts for a 91.0% fatality rate.52 Lukaschek, Baumert, and Ladwig (2011, 
BMC Public Health) also stated that the fatality rate for railway suicides is over 90%.53 In 
a study completed by Radbo and Andersson in Sweden, 41 of the 47 victims (87%) had 
fatal train collisions.54 Mishara quoted similar results for the Netherlands—90% death rate.55 
In a review by Holdaway et al. from the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB), it was 
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reported that the suicide success rate for “mainline train systems” was around 80-90%, 
with variations between systems.56 From a study completed by the RSSB for Great Britain 
between 2001/02 to 2009/10, it showed that 79% of the attempts were fatal.57 Holdaway et 
al. also mentioned that the fatality rate in metro systems tends to be lower.58
Although the above-mentioned studies reported a high rate of success for railway suicide, 
there also have been reports on the lower side. Krysinska and De Leo (2008, Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry) found from many studies that the fatality rate 
ranged from 43% to 94%.59 Holdaway et al. examined some research with low death rates. 
In a study completed on the German FRG system for 391 victims who attempted suicide at 
a station, 94% of males and 92% of females came out injury-free.60 The same study also 
suggested that serious injuries happened more often on open-track attempts (22% of males 
and 41% of females).61 Mishara reviewed a large amount of evidence of low fatality rates. 
There was a 32% fatality rate for attempters on the Boston, Massachusetts subway trains 
between 1966-1972 due to the trains entering the station relatively slowly (Guggenheim 
and Weisman, 1972).62 Mishara had reported in his 1999 study that the fatality rate in the 
Montreal metro was 28%.63 It was stated that 64% of victims were successful in the Munich, 
Germany subway system from 1980-1999 (Ladwig and Baumert, 2004).64 Between 1981-
1986, the death rate in London was 43% (Cocks, 1987), 42% in Hong Kong, and 48% 
in Toronto (Gaylord and Lester, 1994).65 Mishara also mentioned from a 1992 study by 
O’Donnell and Farmer that in a comparison of 23 urban transportation systems, the fatality 
rate was between 20% and 80%.66 
Given that rail suicides constitute a relatively small portion of overall suicides in the U.S., 
it seems logical for rail authorities to focus their suicide prevention efforts on the attempts 
committed on rail property. While some suicidal individuals exhibit signs of wanting to 
commit suicide, others do not. This is an important consideration for the development of 
a strategy for implementing countermeasures. Selecting an appropriate countermeasure 
depends on where those wanting to commit suicide wish to carry out their act, whether it 
will be at station platforms, away from platforms, etc. These issues will be addressed in 
more detail later in the report.
A community abutting a rail system could be affected by suicides committed on the rail 
system. The residents may look to the rail authority to become involved in community-
based suicide prevention measures. From a cost-effective point of view, U.S. rail authorities 
should become involved in such efforts only if they are directly tied to the efforts to prevent 
people from using the rail system to commit suicide. The cause of suicides is a problem 
that should be addressed by the broader community. While it may be tempting for a rail 
authority to become involved in a community-wide suicide prevention effort for the sake 
of improving public relations, the required funds likely would be better utilized for a more 
focused suicide prevention effort on the rail system itself. In all likelihood, the magnitude of 
effort that a rail authority could afford to contribute to a community-based suicide prevention 
project would be very small when compared to what would be required to prevent the 
comparatively large number of suicides committed by other means. By participating in 
such an effort, a rail authority may run the risk of creating an expectation that its effort 
would be successful, whereas the size of the effort would most likely lead to disappointing 
results. This in turn could lead to bad publicity. The public relations effort could probably 
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be more suitably centered on making information available on the specific suicide efforts 
of the rail authority to prevent people from using the rail system as a means of suicide. 
TYPES OF COUNTERMEASURES
The intent of this section is to present a general discussion of the types of countermeasures 
that would be appropriate under different circumstances. The specific types of prevention 
and mitigation measures will be discussed more fully in later sections.
Community-Based Programs
For people who show no indications for committing suicide, prevention measures of a 
general community-based nature could be implemented. These would include any program 
targeting the general population, such as community mental health programs or posted 
signs with phone numbers to call for counseling. Also included would be other forms of 
help if people wanted to talk with someone about contemplating suicide. These types of 
measures are outside the scope of this project, which is concerned with suicides directly 
connected to commuter rail systems.
Signs
Posting signs (with telephone numbers to call for help) on platforms and other places, 
where access could be gained to the track, could aid in suicide prevention for those 
potential victims who exhibit suicidal tendencies, as well as for those who do not.
Access Control
A more direct intervention would consist of preventing or controlling access to rail tracks. 
This measure would help all individuals who may accidentally fall or intentionally jump 
in front of a moving train. This could include overall access control at road crossings 
(grade-separated crossings as well as preventing other access from the road to the tracks, 
possibly with a fence on the road) and fencing off the remainder of the track. Barriers that 
prevent access to the tracks at station platforms fall into this category of countermeasures.
Surveillance and Emergency Personnel
Adding surveillance and response efforts to part or all of the rail property in order to 
detect trespassers, including people who want to commit suicide, could be implemented 
if controlling access is not an option. There are several possible implementation options. 
The surveillance could be done by personnel at selected locations such as the rail stations, 
or remotely with electronic equipment. The surveillance personnel could be trained to 
identify people with suicidal tendencies and then carry out a response. This may involve 
physically dispatching personnel to the location for intervention or responding remotely 
over a loudspeaker. Having trained people conduct the surveillance could lead to a more 
targeted and effective response. 
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Pits
Pits or an excavated area under the rail tracks could be provided as a refuge while a train 
is passing. It may be surmised that this measure would be primarily effective for people 
who fall onto the tracks accidentally, but it possibly could be of help to people who decide 
at the last moment not to go through with a suicide attempt.
Train Operation
The impact of a suicide attempt could be mitigated by running trains at lower speeds 
through stations and other locations where there is history of a high incidence of suicides.
EVALUATING AND PRIORITIZING THE COUNTERMEASURES
Suicides on commuter rail systems have social and economic impacts. Whereas it would be 
difficult to quantify the social impact of a suicide, the economic impacts can and have been 
quantified. The cost of suicides and the implication thereof will be discussed in the next 
section of this report. From an economic perspective, any measure directed at decreasing 
suicides that would cost less than the economic value of the reduction in suicides could be 
considered economically feasible. 
An approach based on the principles of benefit-cost analysis could be followed to identify 
and prioritize candidate suicide countermeasures on rail systems. The benefits are the 
monetary costs of the reduction in suicides resulting from a countermeasure, and the costs 
are those of the countermeasure. The first step in this approach consists of identifying the 
locations and times where candidate projects with high benefit-cost ratios would likely 
be present. The most obvious locations would be those with high incidences of suicides 
because they would offer the most potential benefits, i.e., reduction in the cost of suicides. 
Candidate projects, which could decrease the number of suicides, would then be identified 
based on the benefit-cost ratio. Projects with a benefit-cost ratio greater or equal to one 
would be considered feasible from an economic point of view. The projects would then be 
prioritized based on the benefit-cost ratios.
It should be kept in mind that the use of benefit-cost analysis in project identification 
and prioritization does not necessarily mean that it is always strictly implemented or the 
only consideration in project selection. It should be recognized, however, that whatever 
other factors are taken into account, the benefits are at least equal to the cost and that 
the project priority is justified. Using benefit-cost analysis to the extent possible would 
promote effective and efficient decision-making that would optimize use of scarce 
resources and put the suicide prevention effort on a systematic basis. The methods used 
for calculating benefit-cost ratios and prioritizing projects based on benefit-cost ratios 
are well documented in texts on economic analysis. However, executing a benefit-cost 
analysis and the accompanying data processing is not trivial. It is notable that this type of 
analysis has been the cornerstone of project selection for road safety management, as 
documented in the Highway Safety Manual.67
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Some measures, such as posting signs to deter people from committing suicide, have 
relatively low costs and, conceivably, would be affordable for most commuter and rapid 
rail systems. Consequently, the actual benefit-cost ratio would not be much of an issue; 
the focus would be on the effectiveness of a sign and some concomitant effects, including 
liability if the signs were not properly maintained.
At the other end of the spectrum are other measures, such as controlling access through 
barriers and fencing, which could result in significant costs; the calculation of the benefit-
cost ratio would become a determining factor. As noted before, the number of suicides on 
rail systems is relatively low; therefore, the decrease in the cost of the suicides may not 
offset the cost of the countermeasure – i.e., the benefit-cost ratio may be less than one. 
Cost of Suicides and the Implication for Countermeasures
Calculating the cost of a suicide is a daunting task. A review of available information on this 
topic revealed an array of cost breakdowns. No data were found for the cost breakdown 
of suicides on railways, but some estimates have been made for suicides in general. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated that the average cost for a suicide 
at $1,061,170 based on 2005 data.68
It is recommended that research be carried out to determine the cost of a rail suicide in the 
U.S. because it is potentially higher than the cost of the average suicide. Cost elements 
that are not normally present in the cost of the average suicide may be represented in the 
cost of a rail suicide. Such costs may include the cost of travel delays on the rail system, 
the effects on the surrounding and associated road and public transportation systems, 
and the cost of restoring the rail system to full operational status. The “point-of-view” issue 
must be clarified when using the cost of the suicide in the analysis. The usual approach to 
determining the costs for public projects funded by taxes is to count all costs regardless of 
to whom they accrue. That would mean that societal impacts, such as the cost of counseling 
people who are affected by the suicides and who may not be members of the rail system 
staff, should be included in the costs. Including this higher cost would allow justification of 
higher spending. Conversely, a privately-owned rail system would possibly include only its 
own costs associated with the suicides, which would lead to a relatively lower expenditure 
on countermeasures. Most publicly-owned rail systems utilize tax funds, and the higher 
cost estimates for suicides would be justified. It is essential to recognize that an accurate 
estimate of the cost of a suicide is critical in determining the benefit-cost ratio and the 
feasibility and priority of a countermeasure.
If the estimated $1 million cost of a suicide were accepted and all suicides occurring on 
the systems in the reporting in the 2009 Rail Safety Statistics Report69 (approximately 
30 per year) were eliminated, then the benefits would amount to $30 million per year. In 
order to obtain a benefit-cost ratio of at least one, the equivalent uniform annual value of 
the initial cost plus the increased maintenance and operation costs could not exceed $30 
million. For illustrative purposes, if the increased maintenance and operation costs were 
ignored and only the initial cost were considered (using a real discount rate of 5% and a 
project life of 20 years), the present worth equivalent to the $30 million per year would be 
about $274 million. (Note that these numbers are approximate and do not take inflation 
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into account.) The cost of grade separation, fences, tunnels, and barriers to upgrade all 
the systems to resemble something like the Bay Area Rapid Transit System (BART) in the 
San Francisco Bay Area would probably run into billions of dollars, thereby rendering such 
a solution for eliminating suicides economically infeasible. It was stated previously that the 
economic cost of a suicide could exceed $1 million, which would allow more investment in 
countermeasures. However, preventing someone from committing suicide on rail property 
may not prevent the person from using another means to commit suicide, which would 
negate the real savings of preventing the suicide. There still would be the benefit of sparing 
trauma to the rail personnel and preventing traffic delays and similar costs. 
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The locations where there may be high incidence of suicides can be divided into two 
categories. The first category may be linked to sources of people who may be inclined 
to commit suicide, such as a mental hospital. Locating such “hotspots” would enable the 
focusing of prevention measures by either treating people at the source or taking preventive 
measures on that specific part of the rail property. The second category contains those 
areas on the rail property where most suicides occur regardless of the source, as well as 
the peak periods when most suicides occur. Knowing the periods of highest incidence for 
both of these location types would allow more targeted suicide prevention efforts.
These two major location types will be discussed in the following section, followed by an 
analysis of data obtained for the Metrolink, a commuter rail system in Southern California. 
INFORMATION FROM PAST STUDIES
The definition of a location with a high incidence of suicides or a “hotspot” is not precise 
and is generally determined by whoever analyzed the data and wrote the report. Cox et al. 
(2013) defined a suicide hotspot as a “specific, accessible and usually public site which is 
frequently used as a location for suicide and gains a reputation as such.”70 Andreissen and 
Krysinska’s (2012) five-year study, on the other hand, defined a hotspot as any location 
where at least two suicides were committed within a two-kilometer section.71 Andreissen 
and Krysinska created a list of the major characteristics of hotspots that included ease in 
accessibility to the railway, presence of level crossings within walking distance, and the 
close proximity to a mental health institution.72 They also mentioned that evidence was 
found from the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Australia that hotspots were located 
near mental facilities.73
Based on research, it appears that the peak times for committing suicide on railways is 1.5 
to 3 hours after sunset for males, and 7 to 8 hours before sunset for females (Mishara, 2007) 
(Holdaway et al., 2012).74,75 Holdaway et al. also concluded from research of international 
studies that the railway suicide rate peaks in the late morning and again in the evening.76 
From a Swedish study in which most of the railway suicides were shown to occur during 
the daytime, Mishara explained that this was probably due to the train traffic density being 
higher during the day.77 However, Mishara found that in Germany, more suicide fatalities 
occurred during the night.78 Mishara reported from the Erazo, Baumert, and Ladwig (2005) 
study of Germany that the highest fatality rates occur by attempts from men on open tracks 
during the night on rail lines where the trains are traveling fast.79 Botha et al.80 analyzed 
the suicide patterns occurring on the Caltrain commuter rail system in California and found 
that the time of suicides correlated fairly well with the peak periods of train operations. 
When someone chooses to commit suicide by railway, it can be completed at a station, 
on open track, or at a rail crossing. While jumping in front of a train at a station would be 
considered a highly public event (due to a crowded station), attempting suicide on open 
track or at a rail crossing is usually more private. Studies have shown a wide range of 
results for the location of railway suicides.
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In a study done by Radbo et al. in Sweden from 2000-2002, it was found that 55% of victims 
had died away from the stations, while 30% of them had done so at the stations (Krisinska 
and De Leo, 2008) (Mishara, 2007).81,82 Lukaschek, Baumert, and Ladwig (2011) reported 
similar results for a German study—about two-thirds of the victims had committed suicide 
on the open tracks, and the other one-third were committed in stations.83 A more detailed 
study by the RSSB (Holdaway et al., 2012) from 2001/02 to 2009/10 showed that about 
50% of victims committed suicide on open track, about one-third at stations, and about 
10% at level crossings.84 Holdaway et al. subsequently found that, based on data of 84 
suicides committed on the East Coast Main Line in Great Britain between 1994/5 and 
1998/9, 26.2% of the deaths occurred at the platform or on another part of the station, and 
33.3% took place on open track.85 
Mishara reported from a Netherlands study that 45% of railway suicides occurred at or 
near railway crossings.86 Similarly, Mishara stated that in Turkey, most of the suicides 
occur at level crossings.87 Radbo and Andersson (2012) commented from their study of the 
Stockholm area in Sweden that there appeared to be a relationship between population 
density and suicide incidents, but that the incidents often occurred at the outskirts of urban 
areas, which offered more seclusion.88
It was also noted by Lukaschek, Baumert, and Ladwig (2011) that 70% of those who 
committed suicide at the stations chose specific locations such as the head or end of the 
station platform.89 These data complement the Clarke and Poyner data, which say that 
about two-thirds of the station suicides occur in the first one-third of the station entrance.90
In their study of the Caltrain system, Botha et al.91 found that 20% of suicides occurred at 
stations, and two-thirds within one-half mile of station platforms. Two-thirds also occurred 
within 0.3 of a mile of the road crossings.
Clarke and Poyner (1994, Social Science and Medicine) said that on the London 
Underground, about 85-90% of suicidal incidents take place on the platforms, and 10% 
occur in the tunnels.92 Krysinska and De Leo discussed a study completed in the UK by 
Symonds; 64% of victims had died publicly, with most jumping from a crowded platform, 
and about 33% had died privately on open tracks.93 The higher proportion of suicides 
occurring on stations on the London Underground may be explained by the fact that access 
elsewhere on the system is limited.
It has been found that the number of railway suicides generally correlates with population 
density. Mishara found evidence from Clarke’s 1994 study that the number of railway 
suicides in England increased proportionately to the expansion of their railway system.94 
Most likely, this would be due to most victims committing railway suicide near their 
residences.95 Holdaway et al. also mentioned that suicides are most likely to occur near 
the home of the victim.96 Radbo and Andersson indicated that prevention programs should 
be executed at the locations where most suicides occur.97 From a study taken of five 
districts in Belgium between 2003-2007, it was found that the regional distribution of 
railway suicides mirrored both the regional division of all suicides and the population size 
(Andreissen and Krysinska, 2012).98 Botha et al.99 also found correspondence between 
areas with higher population and suicides.
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FINDINGS FROM THE METROLINK STUDY
The primary intent of this data analysis was to determine suicide patterns along the 
Metrolink Rail System in Southern California to supplement the information from past 
studies. Conclusions summarized in the charts and tables were extracted from raw data 
provided by Metrolink. The data consisted of 49 data points from 2005-2011 and included 
details such as date, day, time, line, cab/location, and county. Raw data for 2012 were not 
provided, although Metrolink’s analysis exhibits 21 suicides for 2012, which is significantly 
higher than the previous years. Also, slight discrepancies can be found in Metrolink’s 
analysis versus the analysis done for this report.
The data do not indicate a clear trend on a year-to-year basis (Figure 1). It is difficult to 
determine long-term trends based on such a short period combined with the relatively 
small number of events.
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Figure 1. Number of Suicides and Attempts per Year
A majority of suicides occurred during the workweek (Figure 2), with relatively higher 
numbers on Wednesdays and Fridays. Ridership on the rail system decreases on 
Saturdays and Sundays, resulting in fewer running trains compared with the workweek 
schedule. In fact, only four out of eight rail lines offer service on Saturdays and Sundays.100 
This decreases the number of opportunities for incidents and suicides involving trains. 
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Figure 2. Number of Suicides by Day of the Week
The data indicated that the peak periods of suicides correlate with the peak periods of 
train operations and commuting hours. Most incidents occurred between 2 p.m. and 
5 p.m., with 4 p.m. as the hour with the highest number of incidents (Figure 3). Frequency 
of running trains and usage of trains is highest during these hours. 
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Figure 3. Number of Suicides by Hour of the Day
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A comparison between the numbers of suicides at crossings versus the numbers at other 
locations indicated that about 37% of suicides were committed at crossings. This indicates 
that prevention measures at crossings could target a significant portion of individuals 
contemplating suicide (Table 1).
Table 1. Suicides at Crossings versus Other Rail Sections 
Other Sections 63.3%
Crossings 36.7%
Figure 4 illustrates the frequency of suicides in specific counties that are serviced by the 
Metrolink system. The populations of the same five major counties are shown in Figure 5, 
based on data from the Census Bureau.101 These data indicate a correlation between the 
population and the frequency of suicides in specific areas. It would indicate that an area 
with a high population has an increased likelihood of suicides. 
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PERSPECTIVE ON FINDINGS
From the discussion just presented, it can be concluded that a variety of times and locations 
have been identified as likely venues for suicides on rail systems. There is significant 
variation in the times, but one common fact is that suicides can occur only when the 
system is in operation. In addition, some evidence shows that more suicides occur during 
peak periods of operation.
A few studies have linked locations to sources of suicides, such as mental hospitals, 
although such a link was not established for the U.S. It was found in a number of studies that 
suicides occur at locations where people have access to the tracks, such as at platforms 
and road crossings. It is important to note that the suicides do not necessarily occur at 
the points of access, but they do occur within a relatively short distance from these points. 
It was also found that more suicides occur in areas with high population. These findings 
are very important for devising strategies and tactics to prevent suicides because the 
prevention efforts can be focused on these areas.
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IV. EXPERIENCE WITH AND RELEVANT ASPECTS OF 
COUNTERMEASURES
The following sections will examine the experience with and relevant aspects of 
suicide prevention practices, with a focus on rail suicides. The discussion will include 
community-based programs as well as use of signs, access control, and surveillance and 
response systems. 
COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMS
As commented by Mishara, most suicide prevention measures have focused on the surface 
issue—preventing people from being hit by trains—instead of the underlying one.102 Training 
personnel, general practitioners, and other medical staff to detect and alleviate depression 
and suicidal ideation in potential suicide victims can be quite beneficial in reducing railway 
suicides and suicides as a whole. The WHO discusses evidence of success. In Gotland, 
Sweden between 1983 and 1984, two-day programs given to all its general practitioners led 
to a drop in the suicide rate, a decrease of inpatient care for depression, and a decrease 
in the number of sick-leaves taken for depression.103 After the program was suspended, 
however, these rates rose back to pre-program levels.104 Another example was from a study 
in Hungary in which a five-year depression management program was implemented for 
general practitioners and their nurses.105 With the addition of a “Depression Treatment Clinic 
and psychiatrist telephone consultant service,” it was found that a huge decrease occurred 
in depression, suicide rates, and suicidal ideation in comparison with the control groups.106
A huge percentage of railway suicide victims have been shown to have psychological 
disorders,107-111 with depression and schizophrenia (psychosis) as the two major forms.112-115 
Krysinska and De Leo (2008, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry) wrote 
about a study completed on the railway systems in the United Kingdom, which found 
that about 60% of victims were diagnosed with psychiatric disorders.116 Other results 
reported by Krysinska and De Leo on the percentages of victims with psychiatric issues 
included 83% in Queensland, 53% in the Netherlands, and up to 81% based on a few 
other studies.117 Holdaway et al. (2012) found data in a 1996 study of the U.K. showing 
that 75% of suicide attempters were receiving mental health care.118 In a study completed 
by Mishara at the Montreal metro between 1986-1996, it was found that 73% of the 129 
victims had received inpatient psychiatric treatment.119 In Hong Kong, analysis showed 
that 66% of suicide victims had psychiatric histories (Law et al., 2009).120 
Mishara found disappointing evidence in his 1999 study in which the majority of metro suicide 
victims had not been taken seriously by their psychiatric personnel after threatening to kill 
themselves the previous day.121 Therefore, it is important for the staff of psychiatric institutions 
to be well-educated and trained properly for evaluating and treating suicidal patients.122 
Due to the high percentage of suicidal individuals with mental instabilities, psychiatric 
patients should be a targeted group for intervention and research. Holdaway et al. 
suggests that working with psychiatric services could be beneficial for personnel training 
purposes; the psychiatric workers could help identify other insightful ways for targeting 
suicidal individuals.123 Mishara agrees that developing a partnership with psychiatric 
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emergency services and institutes may be helpful for railway personnel.124 Although 
results were not given in the study, Andreissen and Krysinska discussed a comprehensive 
suicide prevention program, implemented by Infrabel, which included working with local 
psychiatric services.125 
As stated previously, the number of suicides on rail systems is comparatively small, and 
rail authorities should focus their limited resources on prevention measures near or on rail 
property. As will be discussed in a later section, there could be cooperation between rail 
authorities and community-based programs to decrease suicides on rail systems.
SIGNS AND HOTLINES
Signs with suicide hotline numbers can be placed in rail stations/platforms and other 
locations where a high incidence of suicides may be expected. The hotline is basically 
connected to live individuals in a suicide prevention call center. In addition, actual 
telephones with direct access to a suicide prevention call center could be installed at rail 
stations, platforms and other locations where comparatively high frequencies of suicides 
may be expected.
The suicide hotline telephones can also be placed at locations where suicides are more 
likely to occur. The hotline is basically an emergency service with live individuals available 
to help the caller. In addition to signs, telephones may be provided with direct access to 
the emergency service. 
These forms of suicide mitigation take on a more passive role and encourage the potential 
victim to seek help. Because only a small percentage of railway suicide victims rush onto 
the tracks immediately,126 there is an opportunity for help signs and telephone hotlines to 
deter people from committing suicide. Holdaway et al. mentioned that since many suicide 
victims have an impulsive and temporary intent to kill themselves, messages of dissuasion 
could prove effective.127 
Some journal articles discuss the use of posters and hotlines at railways, but they state that 
little evidence on their effectiveness has been recorded.128-130 Although this may be true for 
railways, these forms of mitigation have shown promise for success in other applications. In 
a journal article published in BMC Public Health in 2013, Cox et al. evaluated many different 
studies that had evidence of suicide prevention.131 Three of these studies had examined the 
effectiveness of help signs and hotline telephones at specific locations (“hotspots”). All three 
studies reported decreases in the suicide rates in their specified locations. 
One of the studies was reported by Lester (2005), who evaluated the addition of “crisis 
emergency telephones” (and of police presence) on the Sunshine Bridge in St. Petersburg, 
Florida, USA.132 Lester compared his findings for a three-year pre- and post-intervention 
period. The results showed that 25 suicides were reported for the pre-installation period 
(8.3 per year from 1996-1998), while 19 suicides were accounted for in the post-installation 
period (6.3 per year from 2000-2002).133 Due to the small evaluation period and only a 
small difference in the number of suicides before and after the sign installation, it is difficult 
to conclude whether or not these results are indeed cause and effect. 
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Another study, examined by Wong et al. (2009), discussed a community-based program 
that was initiated in Cheung Chau, Hong Kong for the purpose of reducing the number of 
suicides that occurred through charcoal burning in rented “holiday flats.”134 A major part 
of the initiative was the addition of a 24-hour telephone hotline service and the hotline 
numbers written in every holiday flat.135 Wong et al. recorded a 4.25-year pre-intervention 
period from 1998-2002 and a 3.5-year post-intervention period from 2002-2006.136 On 
the island of Cheung Chau, the results showed that 37 suicides were completed in the 
pre-installation period (8.7 per year), while only 6 suicides were completed in the post-
installation period (2.0 per year).137 For comparison purposes, Wong et al. also examined 
the number of suicides completed on two other islands with “similar demographic profiles” 
and found no comparative change during the study period.138 
The third study was completed by King and Frost (2005). They evaluated the effectiveness 
of placing signs with the Samaritan’s information in car parks in the New Forest, Hampshire, 
England.139 (Samaritan’s is the largest suicide prevention network, located in about 40 
countries, whose mission is to reduce the occurrences and effects of suicide.) This seemed 
necessary due to the great number of people committing suicide by car exhaust.140 King 
and Frost compared suicides from the 10-year pre-installation period (1988-1998) and the 
three-year post-installation period (1998-2001). With signs placed in 26 car parks displaying 
the Samaritan’s national telephone number, the car park suicides decreased from 10.0 per 
year to 3.3 per year in the pre- to post-installation periods, respectively.141 Krysinska and 
De Leo, and Holdaway et al. discussed similar findings.142,143 King and Frost also recorded 
the suicide count in comparable forest districts without help signs and found no changes 
in the number of suicides during the study period.144 Additionally, they found that the total 
amount of suicides for the district also decreased, meaning that suicide substitution most 
likely did not occur.145 Holdaway et al. found evidence from an unpublished source that a 
continued three-year evaluation showed that suicides in the New Forest district remained 
low, with most occurrences happening in the car parks without signs.146 
Evidence has also been found that suicidal individuals use the services of suicide hotlines 
with beneficial outcomes. Holdaway et al. mentioned a study by Gould et al. (2007) who 
had reviewed the thoughts and actions of suicidal patients during the course of telephone 
sessions.147 Gould et al. discovered a large decrease in suicide attempts throughout the 
course and a continued decrease in “hopelessness and psychological pain” in the weeks 
to come.148 
ACCESS CONTROL
Platform screen doors (PSDs) are one type of barrier commonly being implemented or 
retrofitted into train stations in many European and Asian countries.149 They are also 
becoming popular in many airport shuttle systems in the United States. These sliding-door 
systems create a barrier wall between the platform and the railway tracks; the doors open 
only when an incoming train has come to a complete stop. Different forms of platform 
screen doors exist, including those that extend to the ceiling for an air-tight effect; those 
that extend almost to the ceiling, still allowing natural ventilation; and half-height screen 
doors. These latter doors are much less expensive but also less effective in preventing 
people from intentionally jumping in front of a train.150
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Reducing access to the railway tracks has proven to be an effective way to reduce railway 
suicide rates.151-159 Coats et al.,160 Cox et al.,161 and Law et al. believe that the complete 
separation of trains and passengers is the ultimate method for suicide prevention,160-162 
and platform screen doors fall under this category. In Hong Kong in 2002, platform screen 
doors were installed on all 71 underground platforms of the Hong Kong Mass Transit 
Railway, creating an air-tight barrier between the railway tracks and the platforms.163-165 The 
primary purpose of this railway addition was to save energy by keeping the underground 
stations cool, but it also created a safer environment. The suicide rate at the Hong Kong 
Mass Transit Railway dropped by 81.6%.166-168 A similar system was put into place on the 
Singapore Mass Transit System to save on air conditioning costs; no accounts of suicide 
had been recorded from when the sliding-door system was implemented in 1987 through 
the early 1990s.169,170 It can be seen that in both cases, the drop in suicide rates was a 
beneficial side effect of the primary goal of air control. 
Although the barrier system has proven to be highly effective in preventing suicides on 
railways, it is also expensive.171-176 A few articles have discussed these expenditures for 
the New York MTA. Alex Goldmark wrote an article in Transportation Nation (2011), in 
which he reported criticisms to potential sliding-door barriers being built on the NY MTA. 
Goldmark wrote that State Senator Diane Savino (New York, 23rd District) was completely 
against the idea of barriers because the expense to build and maintain the infrastructure 
would be so costly compared with the number of people it would help.177 Savino also 
believes that with the economic situation at that time, no budget was available for such an 
expense.178 Christopher Zara wrote an article in the International Business Times (2012), 
wherein he noted that in 2012, 146 people were hit by New York City trains, amounting 
to an accident about every 2.5 days, and posed the question as to why platform screen 
doors could not be installed to prevent these incidents.179 He reported that the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority could not afford these installations and also reported that there may not 
be support in New York City for rate hikes to pay for the costs of these improvements.180 
Some estimates have been made for the cost of platform sliding-door systems.
Not only are they expensive, but they also are not a viable option for established railway 
systems. Coats and Walter, Holdaway et al., Mishara, and Clarke and Poyner agree that 
retrofitting existing railway systems is generally not practical or affordable.181-184 Mishara 
mentioned that the Montreal metro system task force had estimated that the cost of 
implementing a sliding-door system into the existing stations “could surpass the system’s 
annual operating budget.”185
Another disadvantage to implementing platform screen doors at the railway stations is 
that they would protect only the passengers at the stations. Research has shown (and 
discussed in another section of this paper) that about one-third of railway suicides occur at 
the stations. Therefore, these expensive systems would be “saving” only one-third of the 
potential suicides if there were other places to access the tracks. 
A benefit-cost analysis was completed by Law et al. (Journal of Affective Disorders, 2009) 
regarding the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway system’s platform screen doors.186 It was 
stated that the MTR Corporation spent $256.4 million for installation of the PSD system. 
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It was also estimated that it would take 50 years to recover the cost through passenger 
boarding ticket sales.187 Due to these facts, gaining support for implementing more of 
these systems is a challenge; evidence must prove that PSDs are cost-effective. 
Law et al. used the “WHO-CHOICE” method and a modified method to analyze the cost-
effectiveness of the platform screen door system. The WHO-CHOICE method took into 
account only the “avertable disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs),” whereas the modified 
method accounted for the avertable DALYs due to railway injuries, the avertable waiting 
time of passengers due to dysfunctional flow of the railway system, and the “corresponding 
financial savings from the loss of fare revenue.” Law et al. used the cost-effectiveness 
classifications recommended by Murray et al., which was based upon the WHO’s 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. It was stated that a project is highly cost-
effective if the cost of a “healthy life-year” saved is less than the state’s GDP per person. 
The project is considered cost-effective and not cost-effective if the saved-life cost is 
between 1 and 3 times the GDP per person, and if the cost is more than three times GDP 
per person, respectively.188
By using the results from the pre- and post-installation periods (1997-2001 and 2003-
2007, respectively), it was calculated that 881 healthy life-years and 201 passenger years 
were averted after the installation of the platform screen doors. With an estimated life 
expectancy of the PSDs at 25 years and a savings of about 3100 DALYs, it was found that 
the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) per life-year was $77,900. This method 
resulted in 3.13 times the GDP per capita. Therefore, the traditional method of accounting 
for DALYs alone was not economically cost-effective. For the modified method, in addition 
to the DALY’S, it was estimated that 460 avertable passenger life-years were saved and 
$7.9 million was saved from loss of fare revenue. These amounted to an ICER of $65,000 
per life-year, or 2.62 times the GDP per person. Therefore, it can be seen that the modified 
version is cost-effective from a larger societal perspective. As mentioned by Law et al., 
comparing the results of these two methods exhibits how changing the analyzed criteria 
can have a significant impact on the resulting outcome. Therefore, Law et al. believe that 
analyzing the DALYs alone is not a sufficient method for calculating the effectiveness 
of the platform screen doors. It also should be noted that other factors contribute to the 
decision process of a cost-effective system, but when information is omitted, unreliable 
estimates are inevitable.189 
For this specific case, a significant component was not accounted for in the analysis: 
electricity savings. It was mentioned earlier that the main purpose for installing the platform 
screen doors at the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway stations was to insulate the areas 
for better air conditioning control. With that said, it seems obvious that the energy savings 
should be a large contributor to the cost benefits of the system. Therefore, all the savings 
from energy-efficiency for the post-installation period would increase the cost-effectiveness 
of the platform screen doors. 
SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE 
Training personnel to detect and handle suicidal behavior is a method to help prevent 
railway suicides. These personnel, who also may be referred to as gatekeepers, may 
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consist of anyone who works for or with the railway system. The chosen workers could 
be trained to recognize and potentially prevent suicidal intentions as they go about their 
everyday responsibilities. Two different forms of trained personnel will be discussed, 
including those who have been trained to alleviate a situation in progress and those who 
have been trained to help prevent a situation from ever arising. 
Training personnel to be aware and respond properly to suicidal behavior can be a powerful 
method to prevent suicides on railways. In an article published in BMC Public Health 
(2011), Lukaschek et al. says that “gatekeeper training” may be one of the most effective 
methods for preventing railway suicide.190 In the study, a questionnaire was given to 202 
German Federal Police officers in June 2010; based on their responses, Lukaschek et al. 
concluded that “identifiable behavioral patterns” can be detected in people attempting to 
commit suicide.191 Officers observed the victims performing similar actions, such as leaving 
behind personal belongings, avoiding eye contact, making erratic gestures, mimicking, 
moving around, having erratic communication patterns, having general confusion, being 
influenced by alcohol, etc.192 The two most identified behaviors—leaving behind personal 
belongings and avoiding eye contact—were seen in about 50% of the victims.193 Holdaway 
et al. verify this finding from evidence found from Gaylord and Lester (1994); it stated that 
suicide victims from the Hong Kong subway had left personal belongings or sentimental 
items, and had covered their faces before attempting suicide.194
A study completed by Radbo and Andersson in the International Journal of Environmental 
Research and Public Health (2012),195 found a complementary piece of evidence. Between 
2005-2008, it was determined that a majority of the suicide victims from the Stockholm 
areas in Sweden (where the research took place) had been waiting nearby or on the 
railway tracks for a while before the train arrived,196,197 In the 2007 Crisis, Mishara also 
reported from a Sweden study that 75% of victims had waited or loitered near the train 
tracks before attempting suicide,198 and that only about 14% of victims attempted suicide 
immediately.199,200 Mishara found a coinciding result from an English study by Abbott et 
al. (2003) that victims had a tendency to wait before a suicide attempt.201 Holdaway et al. 
concluded from Symonds’ (1994) journal article that people who committed suicide on 
railway platforms waited for a while amongst the crowd and also acted strangely.202 With 
all this evidence, it is evident that not only can suicidal behavior be detected, but there 
is also time to intervene. By having the knowledge of behavioral patterns and a period of 
time prior to the suicide attempt, it seems that prevention intervention is possible. 
Experience and proper education are highly important for suicide prevention through 
gatekeeper intervention. From the Lukaschek et al. study, a German police officer had 
experience with 17 suicides, on average.203 Although many of these suicides were not 
personally seen but were informed by eyewitnesses, 35% of the officers still reported 
to have prevented at least one suicide.204 It was found that being successful in suicide 
prevention came from the years of experience as an officer and the number of suicides 
each had experienced.205
Properly educating gatekeepers would be a necessity. Lukaschek et al. believe that using 
some of the knowledge gained by suicide-experienced police officers would be a good 
start.206 Also, evidence has shown that at some stations located near psychiatric facilities 
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in Hong Kong, staff have become adept at identifying suicidal individuals and sometimes 
preventing them from jumping (Clarke and Poyner, 1994)207 The training program would 
teach gatekeepers to detect and recognize people at high risk for suicide, evaluate their 
risk level, and properly manage the situation.208 Proper management and approach would 
be the most important and sensitive step; if done incorrectly, it could lead to dire situations. 
For example, Holdaway et al. wrote of a study completed by Rosen (1976) in which two 
individuals had jumped from a bridge due to the type of approach taken by the bridge 
employees.209 The jumpers stated that they may not have jumped if the workers had 
approached them in a calmer and gentler manner.210 
The World Health Organization declared that gatekeeper training programs have been 
successful by increasing the use of mental health services and reducing the risk of suicide 
in depressed and suicidal individuals.211 The WHO suggests implementing a program 
that trains staff to identify potential suicide victims, improve staff attitudes, increase staff 
medical and psychological knowledge, reduce staff anxiety toward suicides, increase staff 
confidence in preventing suicides, and increase the number of staff members with the 
abilities to monitor and manage a suicidal situation.212
Unfortunately, there have been mixed messages on how well a training program would 
work. In a literature review written by Holdaway et al. for the Rail Safety and Standards 
Board (RSSB), it reports that the “opportunity for intervention may be limited.”213 One of 
these reasons is due to the small window of opportunity for intervention. Research has 
found that many victims impulsively decide to commit suicide with very little time between 
the initial thoughts and completion.214 Holdaway wrote about a study completed by 
Deisenhammer in which 82 patients had been interviewed a couple days after attempting 
suicide; it was reported that almost half the victims attempted suicide in 10 minutes or less 
from their first current thought.215 Holdaway et al. also mentioned from Deisenhammer 
et al. that 76.8% of the suicide victims from a study had reportedly had some form of 
“interpersonal contact” prior to the attempt, but that professional helpers or key personnel 
seemed to be limited in their possibility for intervention.216 The victims’ inclination toward 
pre-suicidal contact generally came in the form of a loved one.217
Some evidence contradicts the notion that victims portray acts of odd behavior. Holdaway 
et al. found from a study by O’Donnell et al. (1996) that only one person had displayed 
weird enough behavior that could have been detected by gatekeepers (or a monitored 
CCTV surveillance system).218 Farmer et al. (1992) had comparative evidence from 
research of the London Underground—that the suicide victims had not necessarily done 
anything unusual enough for trained staff to be suspicious.219 Holdaway et al. also brought 
up the argument that railway staff and key personnel may not have time to pay attention 
to people and identify potential suicide victims, while victims may not be in a state of mind 
to accept help.220
Surveillance systems at railways can be used as an aid for suicide prevention. Mishara 
(2007) discussed how surveillance systems are becoming more widespread and are being 
installed in many metro and railway stations worldwide;221 this demonstrates that now is 
the perfect time to incorporate suicide prevention into the surveillance systems. This form 
of mitigation can be implemented not only to combat suicides, but it can also be used for 
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other important purposes. Many examples for the use of surveillance at railways were 
given by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) including: monitoring the safety and 
security of passengers, employees, equipment, and materials on and off the vehicles; 
providing incident responses; protecting the railway system against “fare evasion and 
fraudulent claims;” alerting operators and personnel of possible delays or closures, and 
of intentional acts of crime or violence; etc.222 Mishara made a similar argument about 
the multifaceted uses of surveillance systems—preventing suicides while also providing 
a safer environment by identifying crimes and accidents.223 The FTA also mentioned that 
surveillance systems are very versatile and could be beneficial in all modes of public 
transportation including urban and rural bus, rail, and ferry systems.224 
Surveillance systems are not versatile only in functionality, but also in implementation. 
Setting up some form of surveillance could work in anyone’s budget—the complexity of 
the system is up to the buyer. With the large variation of existing surveillance technologies, 
the appropriate system can be developed and implemented to fit individual locations’ 
needs. Some of the existing technologies include video surveillance such as closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) cameras, radar technology, alarms, global positioning systems (GPS), 
motion detectors, etc. These technologies can be placed in or around the stations, in or on 
the vehicles, on the tracks, at level crossings, or anywhere else that seems appropriate. 
The following uses for surveillance identify some of the ideas and technologies given by 
research findings. Clarke and Poyner (1994) mentioned how some trains from the Jubilee 
and Central lines in England were considered for the use of CCTV monitors. Placed inside 
the trains, they would to allow the drivers to watch for potential situations developing at 
stations and to stop the trains, if necessary.225,226 Holdaway et al. and Clarke and Poyner 
also believe that stations should be equipped with emergency stop buttons to allow station 
workers to halt trains in cases of emergency.227,228 Clarke and Poyner discussed how this 
technology has already been established on the Victoria line in England.229 Another idea 
from Clarke and Poyner to deter suicides at railways was to strategically use CCTV cameras 
to increase victims’ sense of being watched. Even potential suicide victims aren’t generally 
motivated to kill themselves when being directly watched.230 Because victims committing 
suicide in stations most commonly jump in front of an oncoming train at the entrance of 
the station,231,232 placing obvious cameras blatantly at stations’ headwalls may discourage 
them from doing so.233 Mishara agrees that placing more “obvious” surveillance cameras 
may reduce suicide attempts.234
Honeywell has developed many technologies to improve the safety of railways.235 One 
of these systems, known as Platform Track Intrusion Detection System (PTIDS), uses 
radar technology for platform safety.236 This system can detect if an object is blocking the 
railway tracks, sitting between trains, or appearing at tunnel entrances.237 The system is 
virtually maintenance-free and weatherproof; with its low “false-alarm” rate, the safety 
system automatically stops the train if an object of reasonable size is detected on the 
tracks.238 Honeywell has also created another safety system that detects objects located 
at level crossings when the gates are down for train-passing.239 If there is an obstruction, 
the system sends a signal to the level crossing control system, which prevents the train 
from passing.240
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As previously mentioned, suicides are sometimes reported inaccurately and/or 
incompletely.241 Using surveillance systems would help minimize this claim.242,243 The 
monitors would allow detectives to decide whether a death was accidental or suicidal 
and would potentially help with identity recognition. Not only would this improve 
accuracy, but the systems would also help dictate the effectiveness of different suicide 
prevention measures. The World Health Organization mentioned that without having a 
viable surveillance system, the evaluation of suicide prevention programs is difficult or 
impossible.244 Also, if surveillance systems were implemented in many railway systems 
around the world, data collecting would become more regulated, and comparing suicide 
data from different countries would be more accurate.245
Surveillance systems would also work hand-in-hand with trained personnel. As discussed 
in a previous section, many suicide victims show signs of identifiable behavior patterns.246 
Therefore, if the individuals monitoring the surveillance systems were trained to identify 
these suspicious acts, help could be sent to alleviate the situation. From an article in the 
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (2012), Radbo and 
Andersson also suggest that in situations when railway platforms are very crowded and 
personnel monitoring would be difficult, a surveillance or sensor system at areas of great 
risk (such as where the train enters the terminal) would improve the safety at the station 
and potentially allow time for personnel to save potential victims from self-harm.247
The Federal Transit Administration and Mishara (2007) believe that, in order for surveillance 
systems to be more effective, trained personnel248,249 and video monitor observers250 
would be required.251,252 If there weren’t enough workers to monitor the video screens and 
dispatch help or notify drivers in times of need, the surveillance system would be deemed 
less useful.253
Although little evidence is available on the effectiveness of surveillance systems on 
mitigating suicides at railways, they have proven to be effective in other ways. They have 
created safer environments for transit systems, and they have helped to save money 
from litigations.254 For example, the South Eastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
(SEPTA) had outfitted four of its 1388 buses with a surveillance and monitoring system, 
which resulted in a “32% reduction in claims and a $15 million decrease in annual 
payouts.”255 Similar results were produced when the Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) 
installed cameras in 68 of its 687 buses. Claims were reduced by 35%.256 In another 
case, eight or more CCTV cameras, performing constant surveillance, were placed in 
all Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) stations. The result was a 
decrease in crime rates.257 Other benefits listed by the FTA included “reductions in fare 
evasion and assaults on transit-agency property,” and that transit users reported feeling 
safer with the addition of CCTV cameras.258
Given the benefits that surveillance systems have to offer (in general and for suicide 
prevention), the costs and other issues warrant discussion. The FTA reported that the 
integration of a security system with other technologies can be expensive.259 Mishara 
claimed that the installation and expense of surveillance systems are usually cost-efficient, 
but the personnel necessary to monitor the systems can be extremely costly.260 The FTA 
agreed that the need for personnel training and monitoring may increase due to the 
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addition of a surveillance system.261 Cameras integrated into larger security systems were 
more cost-efficient than stand-alone cameras.262 The FTA also stated that supplementary 
storage equipment would be necessary to archive data.263 
One issue that has been considered is the effectiveness of certain surveillance systems 
for suicide prevention. Mishara discussed how, even with the best surveillance system, it 
may still be difficult to identify a potential victim and intervene in time.264 Mishara (2007) 
also had evidence of effectiveness from his own study at the Montreal metro system in 
Canada.265 He said that about 30 suicide interventions occurred every week, but most were 
initiated by suspicious metro personnel or passengers calling the control dispatchers.266 
Some calls even came from suicide prevention centers informing the metro station of a 
potential attempter, but in the Montreal metro station during Mishara’s time of review, 
interventions due to surveillance camera information were very rare.267 
DRAINAGE PITS
Drainage pits, also known as “suicide pits,” are another form of barriers that indirectly 
prevent suicides on train tracks. As described by Coats and Walter (1999) in the Biomedical 
Journal (BMJ), drainage pits create about a one-meter gap between the ground and the 
railway tracks, enabling victims to fall below the wheelbase and prevent being struck.268 
Although these pits that span the entire station platform were originally intended for platform 
drainage purposes,269 they have successfully reduced the mortality rate for accidental and 
suicidal victims.270-275 Based on Coats and Walter’s study of the London Underground, 
about half the train stations have drainage pits.276,277 In their observational study from 
January 1996 to March 1997, they compared the mortality rates of the railway stations with 
and without drainage pits; the results showed that stations with drainage pits reduced the 
mortality rate by about half—from 76% to 44%.278 A similar result reported by Krysinska 
and De Leo (2008), from O’Donnell and Farmer’s (1992) study of the London Underground 
from 1973-1990, found that the mortality rate for train platforms with and without drainage 
pits was 45% and 66%, respectively.279 It can be seen that the reduced mortality rate due 
to drainage pits was “purely fortuitous as pits were introduced for engineering reasons.”280 
The cost of implementing drainage pits in existing platforms would be very expensive. 
Clarke and Poyner estimated in 1994 that the cost per platform would be about £200,000 
(about $310,000 based on the average 1994 currency rate exchanges).281 They also 
mentioned, however, that the pit costs would be much lower when built into new stations.282 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
32
V. POSSIBLE STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERMEASURE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Based on the preceding discussions, this section will summarize tactics for rail 
countermeasures and provide suggestions on actions that would make the implementation 
more effective and efficient. In addition, improvements to the institutional framework and 
related issues will be discussed, which could also lead to more successful and efficient 
implementation of countermeasures. 
COUNTERMEASURE TACTICS
As stated previously, the locations where candidate projects could be identified would be 
places with relatively high frequencies of suicides because these locations would most 
likely yield the highest probabilities for reducing suicides. These locations were found to 
be associated with areas of high population density, station platforms, and areas close to 
entry points to the rail property, such as a road crossing. It should be noted that in other 
areas of the world, such locations have been associated with “suicide hot spots,” such as 
the proximity to mental hospitals. No evidence yet indicates that these types of locations 
have been identified in the U.S. This may be due to the very low incidence of suicides on 
rail properties in the U.S.
Posting signs in strategic places with phone numbers to call for those who are contemplating 
suicide would be relatively inexpensive. The signs could be concentrated in areas where 
they are more likely to be seen. The most desirable locations for signs should be station 
platforms, entrances to the right-of-way such as road crossings, and places where high 
concentrations of trespassers are prevalent. Moreover, the specific designs of the signs 
could be based on experience with existing rail and road signs to ensure that they are 
readable and notable with the correct degree of primacy (prominence compared to 
other signs). Signs are currently designed for this purpose, such as the signs posted by 
Caltrain.283 Care should be taken that the signs conform to all existing sign regulations on 
railroad property.
Phones with a direct connection to people whom a person contemplating suicide could talk 
to could also be installed, although this may cost more and would require some careful 
benefit-cost analysis. Regarding the staffing of the phone line, the best option for a rail 
authority would probably be to establish a partnership with a community-based center 
that deals with these types of issues. Given the low frequency of suicides on rail systems, 
the benefits would probably not outweigh the costs of establishing such a center for the 
exclusive benefit of the rail authority.
In the case of providing barriers on station platforms, where the prevention of suicides 
is a by-product or a concomitant benefit to the primary project goal of preventing people 
from being jostled and inadvertently pushed onto the tracks or of improving air quality with 
air conditioning, the prevention of suicides could be included in the overall benefit-cost 
analysis of the barriers.
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Possible Strategies for Countermeasure Implementation 
A number of other prevention measures can be utilized that fall between posting signs 
and total access restriction to tracks. These measures are related to surveillance and 
response. This measure can be implemented in numerous ways, with varying degrees 
of effectiveness and cost. Surveillance can be performed directly by rail personnel or by 
equipment such as closed-circuit television. Identification can be performed directly by 
personnel, either on location or remotely. Personnel already on the property can carry out 
direct response and intervention, or perhaps by loudspeaker. Another option is to target 
all trespassers in certain locations. Previous research discussed in Section 3 showed 
that suicides are committed either close to a station platform or close to rail crossings; by 
targeting these locations, a large portion of suicides may be prevented. “Piggybacking” 
onto other functions that rail personnel already carry out has the potential to significantly 
reduce the cost of suicide prevention and lead to a benefit-cost ratio greater than one. 
Station agents, maintenance and operations staff, and security officers could be trained to 
execute these tasks, while personnel who deal with vandals may already be well-suited. 
If there were a community center staffed with personnel answering suicide hotlines, they 
could possibly be contracted to monitor remote cameras on rail property to identify people 
who show signs of wishing to commit suicide. The staff then could initiate a response.
From 2009-2011, a total of 2480 incidents on the Metrolink rail system of Southern 
California required a response. These incidents are classified into several categories, which 
include trespassers, gate malfunctions, passenger illness, etc. Trespassers accounted 
for a total of 830 incidents. It is apparent that the total number of incidents encountered 
by the organization during this period is much larger than the 49 suicides that occurred 
during the much longer period from 2005-2011. These data provide some context for 
the argument made above. It shows that incidents must be addressed continually. Rail 
authority personnel could possibly carry out monitoring of and response to people who 
show signs of contemplating suicide, especially if the cost of the required training would 
be relatively low.
A POSSIBLE STRATEGY FOR IMPLEMENTATION
The number of commuter rail systems in the U.S. is relatively small, and they have 
comparatively low incidence of suicide. Because of this, a strategy for preventing suicides 
may be carried out in what may be described as a focused manner, coordinated by one or 
a limited number of agencies. In contrast, road fatalities number in the tens of thousands 
per year with many road authorities implementing crash mitigation. This situation does not 
lend itself to coordination by one or only a few organizations because of the vast number 
of roadways and jurisdiction. In the case of commuter rail systems, suicide prevention 
could possibly be approached within the following framework. (Note that the literature 
review indicates that some of these actions already take place, although not all of them 
within the U.S.):
1. “Saturate” all rail commuter systems with relatively inexpensive signs with the 
purpose of preventing suicides at platforms and other entry points to tracks. This 
tactic should commence in densely populated areas and could be carried out in a 
relatively short time at relatively low cost. Track the major costs of implementation 
and suicide frequencies annually.
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2. Hotlines could be implemented in a similar way, but they would be more expensive 
than signs. Pilot projects could be identified to document the incidence of calls, 
procedures, costs, etc., to determine the efficacy of this tactic. Linking to existing 
hotlines should be considered.
3. The next step would consist of implementing the surveillance, identification, and 
response systems. A first step may be to implement a pilot project with a rail system 
that has a relatively high incidence of suicides. The implementation methods and 
procedures, the associated costs, and the suicide frequencies within the affected 
sections of track should be documented. Such a documented pilot project could 
commence with platforms and rail crossings in densely populated areas. Because it 
will take a long time and several projects to determine the effectiveness in terms of 
suicide prevention (because suicides are such rare events), the initial focus should 
be on gaining experience and accumulating cost data. Based on this experience with 
costs, the coverage of commuter rail systems with these types of suicide prevention 
projects could then be systematically expanded. By more accurately estimating the 
monetary societal cost of rail suicides and the benefits of reducing them, a better 
sense could be made of whether the prevention measures are cost-beneficial. 
Monitoring the frequency, locations, and times of all suicides on a yearly basis for 
all commuter rail systems, such as done in this and previous research, should not 
be difficult or very costly.
4. A similar approach to implementing barriers on platforms could be carried out, but 
based on the literature review, this measure probably would be better suited to 
metro systems with limited access. It likely would be too costly for the average 
commuter rail system. 
There are some additional considerations for the implementation of the proposed strategy.
Cost estimations associated with countermeasures would change by location, but it would 
be helpful to maintain records of costs to establish a database that could aid in the correct 
cost estimation of similar future projects. Because it may not be cost-effective for each 
rail authority to maintain the expertise to conduct the appropriate analyses and maintain 
a depository for relevant cast data from other rail authorities, it is recommended that an 
agency such as the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) assume responsibility for this 
task, as well as disseminating relevant information and data. It would also be desirable that 
funding be directed toward promoting suicide prevention projects. It should be noted that 
neither the availability of funding nor the legal feasibility for having these tasks undertaken 
by the FTA has been researched as part of this project nor discussed with the FTA. The 
FTA could initiate further research of this topic or take action as desired. The Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) could also become involved because some rail lines are 
shared with freight rail systems and long-distance passenger trains. 
Regarding the benefits of reducing suicides, it was noted previously that the specific cost of 
a rail system suicide may be higher than the cost of an average suicide; therefore, it would 
be beneficial to research the cost of a rail suicide. Regarding costs, it is important to estimate 
the marginal costs of “piggybacking” onto existing operations of commuter rail systems.
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VI. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It was found that the number of suicides committed on rail systems in the U.S. is relatively 
low compared with the total number of suicides committed in the U.S. Only 180 suicides 
occurred from 2003-2008 on 48 commuter, heavy, and light rail systems—about 30 
suicides per year. By comparison, in 2010 alone, 38,364 suicides occurred in the U.S. as 
a whole. It could be reasonably concluded that overall suicide prevention should be the 
responsibility of the community at large; the rail authorities should be focusing their limited 
resources on the prevention and possible mitigation of suicides on the rail property itself 
and on individuals attempting to access the rail property to commit suicide. The community 
abutting a rail system could be affected by the suicides on the rail system and may look 
to the rail authority to become involved in community-based suicide prevention measures. 
However, from a cost-effective point of view, the rail authority should only become involved 
with community-based program when there is a direct connection to preventing suicides 
on the rail system itself, such as through providing phones linked to a community-based 
suicide prevention center. Rail authorities may be tempted to become involved in a broad 
community-based program, to improve public relations, but they will probably be better 
served by focusing on their own effort to prevent suicides on the rail property. 
While it may be tempting for a rail authority to become involved in community-wide suicide 
prevention efforts for the sake of improving public relations, the funds required for this 
probably would be used more effectively in a focused manner on the rail system itself. 
The magnitude of the effort that a rail authority could afford for a community-based suicide 
prevention project most likely would be very small compared with the amount required 
to prevent the comparatively large number of suicides committed by other means. By 
participating in such an effort, a rail authority may run the risk of creating an expectation 
that its effort would be successful, whereas the size of the effort would most likely lead 
to disappointing results. This in turn could lead to bad publicity. The public relations effort 
probably could be more suitably centered on making information available on the rail 
authority’s specific suicide prevention efforts. 
It is recommended that an approach based on the principles of benefit-cost analysis be 
followed to identify and prioritize candidate suicide countermeasures on rail systems. The 
approach consists of identifying the locations and times in which candidate projects with 
high benefit-cost ratios would more likely be present. Candidate projects, which could 
decrease the number of suicides, would then be identified. As a next step, the benefit-cost 
ratios of the projects should be calculated. The “benefits” would be the decrease in the 
costs of the suicides, and the “cost” would be the expense associated with implementing 
the countermeasure. Projects with a benefit-cost ratio greater or equal to one would be 
considered feasible from an economic point of view. The projects then would be prioritized 
based on the benefit-cost ratios.
The locations where candidate projects could be identified would be places with relatively 
high frequencies of suicides because these locations most likely would yield the highest 
probabilities for suicide reductions. These locations were found to be associated with areas 
of high population density, station platforms, and areas close to entry points to the rail 
property such as a road crossing. It should be noted that in other areas of the world, such 
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locations have been associated with “suicide hot spots,” such as the proximity to mental 
hospitals. There is yet no evidence that these types of locations have been identified in the 
U.S., but this may be due to the very low incidence of suicides on rail properties in the U.S.
When calculating benefit-cost ratios, the benefits are the monetary costs of suicide 
reductions resulting from a countermeasure. One amount mentioned in this regard is 
approximately $1 million.284 It is recommended that research be carried out to determine 
the cost of a rail suicide in the U.S. because it is potentially higher than the cost of the 
average suicide. Cost elements that are not normally present in the costs of the average 
suicide may be represented in the costs of a rail suicide. These may include the cost of 
travel delays on the rail system and the effects on the surrounding and associated road and 
public transportation systems, and the cost of restoring the rail system to full operational 
status. The costs associated with the impacts on engineers and train crews are also part 
of the latter cost. The cost effects of personnel turnovers should also be included. The 
“point-of-view” issue will have to be clarified when using the cost of the suicide in the 
analysis. The usual approach for determining the costs for tax-funded public projects is to 
count all costs regardless of to whom they accrue. This means that societal impacts, such 
as the cost of counseling people who are affected by the suicides and who may not be 
members of the rail system staff, should be included in the costs. Including this higher cost 
would allow justification of higher spending. Conversely, a privately-owned rail system 
would possibly include only its own costs associated with the suicides, which would lead to 
relatively lower expenditure on countermeasures. Most publicly-owned rail systems utilize 
tax funds; therefore, the higher cost estimates for suicides would be justified. It is essential 
to recognize that an accurate cost estimate of a suicide is critical to determine the benefit-
cost ratio and the feasibility and priority of a countermeasure.
Maintaining records associated with suicides and countermeasures would aid in the 
correct estimation for similar future projects even if these estimates would change by 
location. It is recommended that an organization such as the Federal Transit Administration 
(FTA) assume responsibility for conducting the appropriate analyses and maintaining a 
depository for relevant cost data from other rail authorities because it may not be cost-
effective for each rail authority to maintain this level of expertise. In addition, the FTA could 
undertake the lead role for disseminating relevant information and data. It should be noted 
that neither the availability of funding nor the legal feasibility for having the FTA undertake 
these tasks has been researched as part of this project or discussed with the FTA. The 
FTA could initiate further research on this topic or take action as desired.
It should be noted that the use of benefit-cost analysis in project identification and 
prioritization does not necessarily mean that it is always strictly implemented or that it 
is the only consideration in project selection. Notwithstanding these considerations, it is 
important to note that this type of analysis has been the cornerstone of project selection for 
road safety management, as documented in the Highway Safety Manual.285 Including all 
other factors taken into account, it should be recognized that when a project is implemented, 
it means the benefits are at least equal to the cost and that the project priority is justified. 
Using benefit-cost analysis to the extent possible would promote effective and efficient 
decision-making that would make optimal use of scarce resources and would put the 
suicide prevention effort on a systematic basis.
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In projects such as placement of signs, there probably would not be a need for benefit-
cost analysis because the cost is relatively low, and the cost of carrying out a benefit-cost 
analysis may not be warranted. However, benefit-cost analyses for higher-cost projects 
become very important in view of the anticipated difficulty of implementing such projects. 
The major reason for this difficulty is that relatively few suicides occur on rail systems, and 
consequently there is relatively little opportunity to decrease the cost of suicides. Based 
on the discussion in the report, it may be necessary to “piggyback” on projects that have 
objectives other than reducing suicides in order to justify implementing the countermeasures. 
A case in point is the implementation of barriers on platforms, where preventing suicides 
is a by-product or a concomitant benefit to the primary project goal of preventing people 
from being jostled and inadvertently pushed onto the tracks. Another example is installing 
barriers to act as “seals” that help improve air quality with air conditioning.
A number of other prevention measures can be utilized that fall between posting signs 
and total access restriction to tracks. These measures are composed of surveillance and 
response. This measure can be implemented in numerous ways, with varying degrees of 
effectiveness and cost. Surveillance can be accomplished directly by rail personnel, or by 
equipment such as closed-circuit television. Personnel can handle identification, either on 
location or remotely. A response and intervention may then be carried out by personnel 
already on the rail property, or perhaps by loudspeaker. Another option is to target all 
trespassers in certain locations. Previous research showed that suicides are committed 
either close to a station platform or close to rail crossings. By targeting these locations, a 
large portion of suicides may be prevented. “Piggybacking” onto other functions already 
being carried out by rail personnel has the potential of significantly reducing the cost of 
suicide prevention and leading to a benefit-cost ratio greater than one. Station agents, 
maintenance and operations staff, and security officers could be trained to execute these 
tasks, while personnel who address vandalism may already be well-suited. If there were a 
community center staffed with personnel answering suicide hotlines, they possibly could 
be contracted to monitor remote cameras on rail property to identify people who show 
signs of wishing to commit suicide. Then they could initiate a response.
A possible strategy for implementing the recommended systematic approach could 
consist of systematically providing coverage of rail systems with prevention measures 
in all critical locations. It could start with placing signs with information about suicide 
prevention hotlines, etc. at platforms and entrances to rail property such as rail crossings. 
Because signs are relatively inexpensive, complete coverage of commuter rail systems 
should be possible in a relatively short time. Implementing surveillance, identification, and 
response systems could commence with a rail system that has a relatively high incidence 
of suicides. Platforms and rail crossings in densely populated areas could be identified 
for the purpose of implementing pilot projects, with different alternative components for 
surveillance, identification, and response. It will take a long time and several projects to 
determine the effectiveness in terms of suicide prevention because suicides are such rare 
events. Therefore, the initial focus should be on gaining experience and accumulating cost 
data. Based on this experience with costs, the coverage of the commuter rail systems with 
suicide prevention projects could then be systematically expanded. It should be noted 
that this systematic coverage must occur on the assumption that a “blanket” coverage of 
critical places, i.e. platforms and rail crossings, will be required starting with the densely 
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populated areas. Previous research in the U.S. has indicated that it would be difficult 
to identify individual “hot spots.” By “piggybacking” onto other functions already carried 
out on rail property, the cost of such a “blanket” strategy will likely not be too high. By 
more accurately estimating the monetary societal cost of rail suicides and the benefits 
of reducing them, a better sense could be made of whether the prevention measures 
are cost-beneficial. Monitoring the frequency of all suicides annually for all commuter rail 
systems, such as done in this and previous research, should not be difficult or very costly.
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PEER REVIEW
San José State University, of the California State University system, and the MTI Board of 
Trustees have agreed upon a peer review process required for all research published by 
MTI. The purpose of the review process is to ensure that the results presented are based 
upon a professionally acceptable research protocol.
Research projects begin with the approval of a scope of work by the sponsoring entities, 
with in-process reviews by the MTI Research Director and the Research Associated Policy 
Oversight Committee (RAPOC). Review of the draft research product is conducted by the 
Research Committee of the Board of Trustees and may include invited critiques from other 
professionals in the subject field. The review is based on the professional propriety of the 
research methodology.  
The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies was established by Congress in the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA). The Institute’s Board of Trustees revised the name to Mineta 
Transportation Institute (MTI) in 1996. Reauthorized in 1998, MTI was selected by the U.S. Department of Transportation 
through a competitive process in 2002 as a national “Center of Excellence.” The Institute is funded by Congress through the 
United States Department of Transportation’s Research and Innovative Technology Administration, the California Legislature 
through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and by private grants and donations. 
The Institute receives oversight from an internationally respected Board of Trustees whose members represent all major surface 
transportation modes. MTI’s focus on policy and management resulted from a Board assessment of the industry’s unmet needs 
and led directly to the choice of the San José State University College of Business as the Institute’s home.  The Board provides 
policy direction, assists with needs assessment, and connects the Institute and its programs with the international transportation 
community.
MTI’s transportation policy work is centered on three primary responsibilities: 
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
Research 
MTI works to provide policy-oriented research for all levels of 
government and the private sector to foster the development 
of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas in-
clude: transportation security; planning and policy development; 
interrelationships among transportation, land use, and the 
environment; transportation finance; and collaborative labor-
management relations. Certified Research Associates conduct 
the research. Certification requires an advanced degree, gener-
ally a Ph.D., a record of academic publications, and profession-
al references. Research projects culminate in a peer-reviewed 
publication, available both in hardcopy and on TransWeb, 
the MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu). 
Education  
The educational goal of the Institute is to provide graduate-lev-
el education to students seeking a career in the development 
and operation of surface transportation programs. MTI, through 
San José State University, offers an AACSB-accredited Master of 
Science in Transportation Management and a graduate Certifi-
cate in Transportation Management that serve to prepare the na-
tion’s transportation managers for the 21st century. The master’s 
degree is the highest conferred by the California State Uni-
versity system. With the active assistance of the California 
Department of Transportation, MTI delivers its classes over 
a state-of-the-art videoconference network throughout 
the state of California and via webcasting beyond, allowing 
working transportation professionals to pursue an advanced 
degree regardless of their location. To meet the needs of 
employers seeking a diverse workforce, MTI’s education 
program promotes enrollment to under-represented groups. 
Information and Technology Transfer 
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to 
professional organizations and journals and works to 
integrate the research findings into the graduate education 
program. In addition to publishing the studies, the Institute 
also sponsors symposia to disseminate research results 
to transportation professionals and encourages Research 
Associates to present their findings at conferences. The 
World in Motion, MTI’s quarterly newsletter, covers 
innovation in the Institute’s research and education pro-
grams. MTI’s extensive collection of transportation-related 
publications is integrated into San José State University’s 
world-class Martin Luther King, Jr. Library. 
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the information presented 
herein. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation, University Transportation Centers 
Program and the California Department of Transportation, in the interest of information exchange. This report does not necessarily 
reflect the official views or policies of the U.S. government, State of California, or the Mineta Transportation Institute, who assume no liability 
for the contents or use thereof. This report does not constitute a standard specification, design standard, or regulation.
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